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By actual count (but with no guarantee of perfect accuracy), there are now 
in print at least 15 casebooks addressed to students taking the first-year course 
in Contracts. An impressive array, certainly, and the more impressive when 
one observes that most of those casebooks, especially the new editions, run 
over 1,000 pages—in one case over 1,600! As to the principal cases, the average 
number is around 170 per casebook. If Note cases are included, the number 
may actually reach 1,000. It follows, obviously, that many teachers in the 
Contracts field want volume and coverage, and apparently the more the better.
How well this meets the interests of first-year law students I am not so sure. 
On the basis of totally unsystematic sampling, I have found over the years that 
there are only a few, a very few, Contracts cases that students remember by the 
time they reach their second year. It is a remarkably consistent list, which I 
attribute in part to the emphasis those cases apparently get from instructors, 
in part to the fact that almost every casebook includes those cases and gives 
them prominence—often by placing one or more at the very beginning of the 
casebook—and in part to the outright silliness of many of the cases themselves. 
The cases I have in mind—Hamer v. Sidway, Hawkins v. McGee, Jacob & Youngs, Wood 
v Lucy, Peerless, Peevyhouse, Alaska Packers, Sherwood v. Walker, Lucy v. Zehmer, Lefkowitz v. 
Great Minneapolis Surplus Store, and a few others—will be recognized at once and 
with a groan by anyone who has ever taught the course. Many instructors, I 
believe, would be likely to view the cases just named, however memorable to 
students, as wrong in outcome, or at least doubtfully reasoned, or perhaps 
better explained on other grounds and for other reasons than those expressed 
in the opinions themselves.
The point I am suggesting is that the decisions best remembered by our 
students are largely freaks—that is, single instances unlikely ever at any time 
to be repeated in the same form. But then why do we teach them? Could it 
be, as one leading scholar has suggested to me, that the cases, or at least a fair 
number of them, are actually selected for their amusing narrative value rather 
than as illustrations of something more serious? If that is true, then I suppose 
I should say so to my students—we can all have a chuckle—and warn them that 
what is truly serious and important in the Contracts field will be reserved for 
an advanced course, assuming there is such a course and assuming anybody 
takes it. 
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As you know, a small but growing number of law teachers have lately 
suggested that the great days of Langdell and the case method have begun 
to show their age. I wish to join the rising chorus, at least as far as teaching 
Contracts is concerned. Putting it differently, how many appellate decisions—
along with the Restatement and Article 2 of the UCC—do we really need to 
teach Contracts? My guess: no more than ten or 15—certainly not a cascade of 
more than 170—and despite their comic appeal, none of those cited just above. 
The cases of my selection would have one consistent theme, to-wit, the 
inadequacy of legal draftsmanship. Under that heading, the relevant classroom 
questions would be:
1. Why did the litigated issue arise?
2. Could the problem have been foreseen?
3. If foreseeable, could it have been dealt with through further negotiation 
despite some added cost (though less, presumably, than the cost of 
litigation)?
4. Even if the answer to 2 and/or 3 is no, would there be any contractual 
means or mechanism that could have been adopted to deal with 
unforeseen or unresolved contingencies?
But suppose that even 4 fails us. Then, finally, the instructor has an 
opportunity to state at length how he or she, in the person of a court, would 
approach and resolve the great and pervasive issue of contract interpretation, 
which is inevitably, in one form or another, the central question in almost 
every case that arises. At this point, one or more of my (or your) selected cases 
can be revived and used as a basis for discussion. Policy at last—technical, to be 
sure, but policy nonetheless and as such very welcome. The current scholarly 
debate between textualism and contextualism could be the framework for a 
useful and far-reaching discussion, but there are of course many other policy 
themes that the instructor might prefer.
The result: our students receive both a practical and a theoretical 
introduction to the field of Contracts. Theory and practice are joined at the 
hip, which I think is as it should be.
